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Voices from the Stars? America's 
Generals and Public Debates 
Maj. Gen. CharlesJ. Dunlap, Jr., USAF 
Military officers rarely relish the prospectoftestit)r-
ing before Congress, particularly ifit means dis-
agreeing with the Commander-in-Chief. As I can 
personally attest, it is absolutely excruciating when 
headlines like "Military Lawyers Fault Bush Plan for 
Terror Suspects" follow your testimony. Loyalty to 
one's commander is a bedrock value ofthe profes-
sion of arms, and seeming to deviate from it is 
counterintuitive to every officer's makeup. Re-
spectful disagreement with policy drafts is not, one 
hopes anyway, viewed as disloyalty. 
The protocol ofCongressionaltestimony is, I 
learned, for Administration officials to clear an 
officer's opening statement. However, once 
questioning begins, the process permits personal 
opinions identified as such. That is what happened 
when senior military lawyers Gudge advocates-
"JAGs") testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) hearings in early September on 
the complicated issue of the legal architecture for 
militmycommissions. 
As only a democracy like America's can tolerate, 
the concerns of the JAGs received a very public 
airing. Opponents ofthe Administration's plan 
understandably seized upon the critical portions of 
the testimony as demonstrating the proposal's 
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flaws. Shortly thereafter, however, those same 
opponents were perplexed when the judge advo-
cates who had testified vigorously against key parts 
ofthe draft nevertheless signed a letter saying they 
did not object to two other portions ofthe proposal 
(purporting to clarifY the meaning of Common 
Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions). 
Why the consternation? Unbeknownst to the 
military attorneys, the "do not object" language was 
touted by some advocates of the Administration's 
proposal as indicating support for harsh CIA 
interrogation techniques. Of course, this JAG (and 
likely the others) had not only never subscribed to 
that view, he had never been asked to opine upon 
it. The letter was signed wholly in the context of a 
JAG's knowledge and expertise, that is, the armed 
forces, not the activities of intelligence agencies to 
which he is not privy. 
Such is the nature ofW ashington politics. In an 
article aptly headlined "Military Lawyers Caught in 
Middle on Tribunals" the New York Times ob-
served thatthe experience "demonstrated the perils 
of active-duty officers' speaking openly about 
sensitive subjects." Regardless, the two main 
opponents in this controversy eventually achieved a 
compromise that included rectifYing the key prob-
lems the JAGs had identified in their RASC testi-
mony, as well as in earlier Congressional hearings. 
JAGs arenotthe only senior officers who find 
avoiding political minefields difficult, especially in an 
election year. Consider the situation of Genera I 
George Casey, America's top commander in Iraq. 
At a Pentagon news conference lastJune, he 
insisted that setting a timetable for withdrawal 
would "limit his flexibility" and "send a terrible 
signal" to Iraq's new government of national unity. 
This presumably strictly military opinion also 
happened to dovetail perfectly with the view of one 
sideofahighly-politicizeddebate. Yet hardly a day 
later media reports claimed that a drawdown was, 
in fact, under consideration by the general, much to 
the delight ofthe other side of the argument. 
Others may determine there is no real inconsistency, 
but the question remains: what is the proper public 
role of active duty officers? Most active duty 
generals fully appreciate the dangers of an overly-
assertive military caste. The deeply-ingrained 
American tradition of an apolitical military subservi-
entto civilian control properly instills reticence, 
especially in the senior ranks. 
Generals also know the risks of disagreeing with the 
civilian leadership. Accepted wisdom holds that 
officers should invariably reflect the views ofthe 
Executive Branch. Stray from the officialline? The 
treatment of Army General Eric Shinseki after 
testifYing honestly (and, as it turns out, accurately) 
about troop requirements for Iraq's occupation is 
widely viewed as an object lesson ofthe most 
negative type. 
Some believe generals can speak their minds so 
long as they limitthemselvesto purely military 
matters. The problem? There is really no such 
thing as "purely" military matters. Clausewitz 
famously observed that war is "a continuation of 
political intercourse ... by other means." With war's 
enormous demand on blood, treasure, and national 
honor, military matters intertwine every dimension 
of an at ion's life, including politics. 
Instinctive loyalty to -and respect for - the chain of 
commanddisinclinesmilitaryprofessionals from 
airing their personal views. This is as it should be, 
unless and until that loyalty and respect becomes 
interpreted publicly as ideological agreementthat 
contradicts their true professional judgment. The 
Supreme Court rightly advocates insulating the 
armed forces from "the reality or appearance of 
acting as a handmaiden for partisan political 
causes." 
A fundamental misunderstanding of the real meaning 
of civilian control also confuses the issue. Of 
course, it requires prompt, respectful, and comp lete 
obedience to lawful orders. But it does not man-
date open support -or even silent acquiescence-
Continued on page 10 
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Schraggercaptures an example of this unique 
America's Generals... perspective thatJAGs acquire: 
Continued from page 9 
to the partisan views ofthe military's civilian mas-
ters. 
Actually, unlike the militaries of some nations, 
American military officers do not take an oath of 
fealty to any particular individual or political party, 
but rather to the Constitution itself. The Constitu-
tion, in turn, tasks all the three branches of govern-
mentwith civilian-<:<>ntrol responsibilities. 
The Executive and Legislative branches usually 
predominate because they are subject to the 
electorate as the courts are not. For this process to 
work properly, however, elected officials and, 
ultimately, the people themselves, need the fullest 
possible exposition ofthe issues. In America' s 
democracy, the FirstAmendment facilitates the kind 
of public discourse that produces the world's most 
powerful military. 
Logically, the expert views of senior military lead-
ers, including its JA Gs, would seem to enhance a 
discussion of any other national security matter. 
F ormany reasons, career military officer-lawyers 
have views distinct from their civilian counterparts. 
Because they are military officers, JAGs strive to be 
independent and nonpartisan in ways a civilian 
lawyer who is a political appointee need not be nor, 
especially, oughtto be. 
And there is more. Long-term service in uniform 
gives JAGs a depth of understanding of armed 
forces - the "separate society" in Supreme Court 
parlance-to a degree impossible to acquire 
otherwise. As fellow military members subjectto 
the same altruistic "unlimited liability contract" that 
everyone in uniform undertakes, they have a special 
bond with those with whom they serve that simply 
cannot be replicated. 
All ofthis creates a different mindset in JAGs. In an 
especially insightful recent article in Slate (http:// 
www.slate.com/idl2150050/)Professor Richard 
Military lawyers seem to conceive 
oftheruleoflawdifferently[than 
civilian counterparts]. Instead of 
seeing law as a barrier to the 
exercise oftheir clients , power, 
these attorneys understand the law 
as a prerequi site to the meaningful 
exercise of power. Law allows our 
troops to engage in forceful, violent 
acts with relatively little hesitation or 
moral qualms. Law makes just wars 
possible by creating a well-defined 
legal space within which individual 
soldiers can act without resorting to 
their own personal moral codes. 
In any event, a nation dependent upon an enormous 
all-volunteer force oughtto knowwhattheirmilitary 
leaders are thinking. Indeed, opening their gener-
als' opinions to public scrutiny might serve a 
democracy's long-term interests. Nevertheless, 
should concepts of duty and decorum exclude 
generals from public dialogue? Absolutely, if the 
subject is, for example, the suitability of civilian 
leadership. Likewise, security and operational 
concerns can appropriately close mouths. 
The danger of unsettling the troops also obliges 
caution. Lt. Gen. John Vines, then a senior com-
mander in Iraq, reportedly characterized the mere 
existence oflastwinter' s Congressional debate 
about Iraq as "disturbing." This is indeed sobering 
commentary because everyone understandably 
fears undermining the morale of soldiers far from 
home. 
Yet real support ofthe troops might demand a 
frank, national debate, however painful. Still, 
should America' s generals participate? Ifso, how? 
Occasional congressional hearings seem to be an 
appropriate forum, but are such hearings the only 
proper outlet? Uncertain oftheir authority to speak 
openly, some generals may talk privately to the 
press, members of Congress, or to another proxy-
including officers in the retired ranks. 
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But is this the way Americans oughtto divine the 
views oftheir still-serving generals? Plainly, few 
fully accepted paths exist. The electorate and their 
political leaders need to decide when and how they 
wantto hear from their generals, ifatall. Once they 
decide, it is then forthe generals to salute smartly 
and obey. 
Charles Dunlap is Deputy Judge Advocate 
General of the Air Force. These are his per-
sonal views and not necessarily those of the 
Department of Defense. 
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